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Abstract: This study originated from events that occurred 
in 2014 in an Italian hospital, where the embryos of a 
couple, obtained by means of homologous insemination, 
were mistakenly implanted into the uterus of another 
woman who, along with her husband, underwent the 
same treatment.
Faced with this serious adverse circumstance, that gives 
rise to ethical and legal issues, the authors conducted a 
comparative examination of how to consider the divi-
sion of maternity (between biological mother and uterine 
mother) and the related division of paternity (between 
genetic father and legal father, husband or partner of the 
gestational mother).
Some preliminary observations are made concerning 
parenthood and filiation within the context of currently 
applicable Italian law. 
The following is a detailed analysis of the arguments 
in favour of the parental figures involved (gestational 
mother/genetic mother).
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1  Introduction
The significance of health, in its most modern and evolved 
sense, as a general and inviolable expectation in one’s 
“search for happiness” [1] suggests that any prospect of 
not being able to fulfil one’s desire to become a parent is 
unacceptable.
Assisted reproductive techniques have enormously 
extended the possibilities of “having a child” but at the 
same time they have further complicated the issues relat-
ing to the determination of filiation.
The simplest situation seems to be that of so-called 
homologous assisted reproduction, where both partners in 
a couple participate and thus where there is a coexistence 
of biological, legal and social parenthood. Even in this 
field, however, controversial issues arise. For example, 
who can legitimately become a parent in cases where an 
embryo, obtained in vitro with oocytes and sperm from an 
identified couple, is implanted by mistake into the uterus 
of a women who is extraneous to the couple?
2  Discussion
In this regard, at least three cases have been reported in 
the USA where the outcomes were different. In 1999 there 
was the case of Richard and Donna Fasano of New York, 
who had twins, one of which was black, due to a mistak-
enly implanted embryo. The biological parents obtained 
custody of the child, who was thus separated from his 
brother. 
In 2004 an “extended family” was created when a 
judge ruled on a matter in which a woman from Califor-
nia (Susan Buchweitz) had been implanted with embryos 
from another couple. In this case, besides ordering a 
one-million-dollar compensation, the magistrate ruled for 
“joint custody” of the child.
Five years later (2009), Carolyn Savage from Ohio, 
due to a mistake by the clinic, gave birth to another cou-
ple’s son. The couple took the case to the same clinic, and 
Carolyn decided to return the child to them. “The doctors 
immediately advised me to have an abortion” said Carolyn, 
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but “what I was carrying in my womb was a human life 
and we had to protect that. It didn’t matter if that child 
was in the wrong tummy. It wasn’t our fault or his parents’ 
fault. I put myself in the shoes of that child’s mother: what 
would I have done if my son had been in another woman’s 
tummy? Wouldn’t I have prayed with all my heart for that 
woman to let my son live?”.
And finally in 2011, in Hong Kong, two “mistaken” 
embryos were implanted into a woman. The matter was 
brought to a close with an abortion [2] and payment of 
compensation [3].
In Italy, however, in the last eighteen years only three 
cases have reached the pages of the national newspa-
pers: two in Turin (2004) and Padua (2009), where on the 
morning of the implant the doctors realised the mistake 
and the women decided to have medical abortions. 
Another case occurred in 2014 at the Sandro Pertini Hos-
pital in Rome where, because of a banal human error, two 
couples who had given their consent to assisted reproduc-
tion were assigned the embryos of the other. 
These two parallel implants did not have the same 
outcome: one was not successful, in that the pregnancy 
did not even initiate; the other led to the successful birth 
of twins.
The couple, to whom the genetic heritage of the 
expected twins was traceable, lodged an appeal to the 
court of Rome.
On this subject, there is an illuminating opinion 
expressed by the National Bioethics Committee entitled 
“Bioethical considerations on the involuntary switching of 
embryos”, published on 11 July 2014, where the text reads: 
This is a case of “mistaken” heterologous fertilisation 
(the mother carries embryos that are genetically not hers 
nor her husband’s or partner’s) or “mistaken” surrogate 
mother (the genetic parents produce embryos that are 
implanted into the uterus of another woman who carries 
them for gestation) in a procedure for which no consent 
has been given, which appears to lead to a position of 
uncertainty with regard to the maternity and paternity 
faced with a legislative gap that needs to be filled in terms 
of interpretation”.
Thus, in its order of 8 August 2014, the court of Rome, 
after establishing that currently applicable Italian law 
neither addresses nor explicitly regulates the circum-
stance in question, stated that it would be unreasonable 
in relationships of filiation to assign superordinate status 
to the principle of genetic truth over other conflicting 
interests, because “recognising the prevalence of the 
genetic mother, juridical legitimacy would be attributed 
to a coercive substitutive maternity, with the renunciation 
having been imposed on a child that the biological mother 
brought into the world”. This solution would be “totally 
unreconcilable with the right of the mother carrying the 
foetus to the intangibility of her body and, therefore, to 
being able to make every decision relating to her preg-
nancy, as well as being seriously damaging to the human 
dignity of the expectant mother”.
With an appropriate reference to scientific literature, 
the order also points out that it is in the uterus that the 
symbiotic relationship is created between the unborn 
child and the expectant mother and that it is only the 
latter who can breastfeed the child.
After all, – reads the order – the figures of genetic 
mother, uterine mother and social mother (i.e. a woman 
who, wishing to have a child but unable to procreate one, 
“commissions” a child from the genetic mother) do not 
always coincide. However, art. 269, subsection 3, of the 
Civil Code, unchanged from its original wording even fol-
lowing the reform on filiation, as per Legislative Decree 
154/2013, enshrines the principle by which it is birth that 
determines motherhood.
For this reason, the judge dismissed the couple’s 
appeal and left the twins to the mother who had given 
birth to them and to her partner, sustaining that any 
interim injunction would have prejudiced the stability of 
the minors’ status and their right to life with what should 
be considered their family. 
3  Conclusions
The uncommon split in natural contribution between 
genetic and uterine mothers imposes the need to make 
a “tragic choice between two partial truths” [4] that are 
both of equal importance. Whilst the passing on of genetic 
makeup to the unborn child depends on the former, it 
is the latter who prepares him/her for life, through the 
unbreakable bond that is created, during pregnancy, 
between her own vital functions and those of the foetus 
she is carrying in her womb.
Albeit, in the light of the abovementioned legally cod-
ified principle (art. 269, subsection 3, Civil Code), a strong 
orientation has been established, also in the last hypoth-
esis, towards attribution of maternity to the birth mother 
[5-8], such a solution has not failed to give rise to differ-
ences between scholars.
Those who highlight the essential and conditioning 
value – aimed at possibly identifying the true mother 
based on the dual biological and social factor – of a 
precise legislative ruling oriented in this direction [9], are 
opposed by those who, by taking a different path, con-
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sider, on the basis of existing law (de jure condito), the 
“gynaecological” fact of birth to be insufficient [10-12].
From the latter perspective, it has been observed that 
the law’s attribution of maternity to the birth mother is 
only apparent. The principle that underpins the rule con-
tained in art. 269, subsection 3 of the Civil Code should, in 
fact, be read in the sense that the mother is the woman who 
gives birth to the product of the fertilisation of her (own) 
oocyte. If Italian lawmakers did not expressly require the 
subsistence of such a coincidence between birth mother 
and genetic mother, this would have depended – it has 
been said – exclusively on the fact that it was impossible 
for them to imagine the emergence of a different situation.
Therefore, in cases where, as a consequence of the 
practice of leasing out the uterus, such a coincidence 
does not effectively subsist, the choice between the two 
women should be made taking account of the interest of 
the child that is to be born, who, according to the orien-
tation considered, is identified in the attribution of par-
enthood to the genetic mother (provided that she is the 
commissioning mother) [13]. Indeed, only the latter would 
have an emotional, as well as biological, bond with the 
child, considering not only her genetic but also social con-
tribution – having consciously and responsibly given rise 
to the causal chain of actions that conclude with the birth 
– made with the creation of the embryo [14].
All in all, however, attribution of legal maternity 
to the birth mother remains the most accredited thesis. 
Among the arguments in support of this option, it appears 
that particular importance should be given to the fact that 
the child acquires legal capacity at the moment of separa-
tion from the maternal womb, without minimally pointing 
to the circumstance that the birth follows the implanting 
of another woman’s ovum into the gestational mother’s 
body [15]. It can be observed, furthermore, that it is in the 
behaviour of the gestational mother that there is a need to 
identify the element of personal responsibility in order to 
define the juridical concept of maternity [8]. It is thanks 
to the contribution of the gestational mother that the life 
of the person springs forth and develops in a symbiotic 
bond with the mother up to the moment of birth [5,6,16]. 
The birth mother is not a machine for producing children, 
nor is she an animal whose womb can be used to provide 
a purely material service [5]. But, above all, it is the ges-
tational mother who must remain the “arbiter” of the 
destiny of the pregnancy [17].
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